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Abstract
The author argues for the following as constituents of the moral virtue of open- mindedness: (i) a 
second- order awareness that is not reducible to first- order doubt; (ii) strong moral concern for 
members of the moral community; and (iii) some freedom from reactive habit patterns, particularly 
with regard to one’s self- narratives, or equanimity. Drawing on Buddhist philosophical accounts of 
equanimity, the author focuses on the third constituent, equanimity, and argues that it is a central, 
but often ignored, component of the moral virtue of open- mindedness, and its absence can explain 
many failures of open- mindedness.
open- minded when many people in her situ-
ation would fail.2
 An account of open- mindedness as a 
moral virtue should be able to explain what 
contributes to failures, as well as successful 
applications, of open- mindedness. An intui-
tive understanding of the open- minded person 
as someone who recognizes her fallibility 
is not sufficient since most of us are able to 
recognize that we are fallible beings yet fail 
to apply that knowledge in the appropriate 
situations. A recent attempt to understand 
open- mindedness in terms of robust moral 
concern (Arpaly 2011) is also insufficient, 
since failures of open- mindedness can occur 
even when robust moral concern is present.
 I argue that the moral virtue of open- 
mindedness is a character trait that includes 
at least the following three characteristics: 
(i) a second- order awareness that is not re-
ducible to first order doubt; (ii) strong moral 
concern for members of the moral community; 
Some people are able to revise even their 
most cherished beliefs in response to chal-
lenges, and others are not able to, even when 
the stakes are high for failing to do so. Wendy 
Montgomery, a lifelong Mormon, grew up 
believing that homosexuality is a sin, for 
which AIDS is God’s punishment. When 
she learned, by reading his diary, that her 
thirteen- year- old son was gay, she thought: 
“Either everything I knew about homosexu-
ality is wrong, or my son is not really gay. 
And, he is obviously gay.” She had to then 
“unlearn everything that [she] had learned” 
before. With considerable effort, she was not 
only able to accept her son’s sexual orienta-
tion, but also became a public advocate for 
LGBTQ Mormons.1 How was Wendy able 
to do this? Other parents who have grown 
up with similar beliefs to Wendy’s, and who 
also love their children, are not able to use 
their child’s experience to challenge their 
beliefs. Wendy Montgomery was able to be 
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and (iii) some freedom from reactive habit 
patterns, particularly with regard to one’s 
self- narratives, or equanimity. After a brief 
discussion of the first two characteristics, I 
focus on the third, equanimity, which I argue is 
a crucial aspect of open- mindedness that is not 
explored in Western philosophical accounts of 
this virtue. Drawing on Buddhist philosophical 
accounts of equanimity, I argue that equanim-
ity is a central component of the moral virtue 
of open- mindedness and its absence can ex-
plain many failures of open- mindedness.
 I orient my discussion of open- mindedness 
in the context of morality, understood broadly 
as including respect for self and others, care, 
and concern for the welfare of self and others. 
This is not to deny that open- mindedness is 
an epistemic virtue, or even primarily an epis-
temic virtue, but rather to highlight the ways 
that this virtue also arises in moral contexts. 
Although I doubt that a strict delineation be-
tween epistemic and moral virtues ultimately 
can be made (Driver 2003; Zagzebski 1996), 
there are nevertheless contexts in which open- 
mindedness can arise that are primarily ethi-
cal (such as Wendy Montgomery’s situation) 
and others that are primarily epistemic (such 
as a scientist open- mindedly considering 
counter- evidence to her hypothesis). For the 
purposes of this paper, I call virtues that focus 
on or arise in the context of the desire for truth 
“epistemic virtues” and virtues that focus on 
or arise in the context of our relationships 
with others as members of the moral com-
munity “moral virtues.” Open- mindedness 
can be motivated by the desire for truth or the 
desire to respect or care for self and others (or 
some combination). My interest here is in the 
range of cases in which open- mindedness is 
primarily motivated by respect and care for 
members of the moral community. Thus my 
account will be incomplete, as the charac-
teristics of open- mindedness that I claim are 
necessary in primarily moral contexts may not 
apply equally to primarily epistemic contexts.
1. Open- Mindedness  
and Second- Order Awareness
 One puzzling feature of open- mindedness 
as a (epistemic or moral) virtue is that it is not 
obvious how one can be open- minded about 
her beliefs while simultaneously actually 
believing them (Adler 2004; Riggs 2010). 
How could one confidently hold a belief 
while at the same time genuinely be open to 
the possibility that it is wrong? But it would 
be troubling to think that the open- minded 
are those who are lukewarm about their be-
liefs, since surely it is also important to be 
open- minded about at least some of those 
beliefs one feels strongly about, including 
political, religious, and moral beliefs. The 
mark of a person who has the virtue of open- 
mindedness, it seems, is her ability to be 
open to evidence that some of her cherished 
beliefs—and not just her less confidently 
held beliefs—may be mistaken.
 As Jonathan Adler (2004) and Wayne Riggs 
(2010) have argued, this puzzle of open- 
mindedness can be avoided if we understand 
open- mindedness as a second- order attitude. 
Open- mindedness is (or, at least, includes) an 
attitude that one takes about one’s beliefs, 
namely that they could be mistaken. It is, as 
Riggs puts it, “to be aware of one’s fallibility 
as a believer, and to be willing to acknowl-
edge the possibility that any time one believes 
something, it is possible that it is wrong” 
(Riggs 2010, p. 180). It is not (or, not neces-
sarily) a lack of confidence in one’s particular 
beliefs that motivates open- mindedness, but 
a more general (second- order) recognition 
that one is a fallible being. Open- mindedness, 
then, is not first- order doubt but the second- 
order attitude that it is possible that one’s 
first- order beliefs are wrong, despite being 
confidently held.
 But how does the general recognition of 
fallibility translate to particular expressions of 
the virtue of open- mindedness? We may share 
J. S. Mill’s skepticism about our capacity to 
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fully integrate the recognition of our own 
fallibility:
Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, 
the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying 
the weight in their practical judgment, which is 
always allowed to it in theory: for while every 
one well knows himself to be fallible, few think 
it necessary to take any precautions against their 
own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any 
opinion of which they feel very certain, may be 
one of the examples of the error to which they 
acknowledge themselves to be liable. (Mill 
1978, p. 17)
 Adler argues that Mill’s position rests on 
an underlying misunderstanding: Mill is 
confusing the second- order attitude of open- 
mindedness (the general recognition of one’s 
fallibility) with the first- order belief that one 
is actually wrong (Adler 2004, p. 132). The 
open- minded person does not (and should 
not) constantly doubt the truth of her beliefs; 
rather, recognizing her general fallibility, she 
checks the truth of her beliefs selectively.3
 But something still remains of Mill’s worry: 
how does the open- minded person apply 
this general knowledge of her own fallibil-
ity, even selectively? After all, the general 
recognition that one, like all human beings, 
is fallible is uncontroversial and would not 
serve to distinguish those with the virtue 
of open- mindedness from those without it 
unless that recognition is integrated into the 
agent’s habits of thought, feeling, and action 
in the appropriate ways. But it is not clear 
how this integration occurs, especially given 
the temptation to think “yes, I am fallible 
but I’m surely not mistaken now (or now, or 
now . . .).”
 Riggs suggests the practices of self- 
knowledge and self- monitoring to help fill 
the gap between the general recognition of 
oneself as fallible and the application of this 
recognition to actual cases. In order for one’s 
recognition of one’s own fallibility to actually 
manifest as the virtue of open- mindedness, 
one has to understand the mistakes to which 
one is susceptible, and then monitor one’s 
own reactions in order to properly recognize 
occasions for open- mindedness (Riggs 2010, 
pp. 182–184). While this is surely right, 
there remain several questions that need to 
be answered: What is the relevant kind of 
self- knowledge? How is it attained, and how 
are blind spots overcome? Can we monitor 
ourselves effectively, or must we rely on oth-
ers? As I hope to show in section 5, Buddhist 
concepts of equanimity help answer some of 
these questions.
2. Robust Moral Concern  
and Open- Mindedness
 Understanding open- mindedness as the 
disposition to have second- order awareness 
that recognizes one’s own fallibility allows us 
to say, as we surely want to, that lack of con-
fidence in one’s beliefs is not the only reason 
one could be motivated to be open- minded. 
The recognition of fallibility combined with 
the desire for truth provides motivation to be 
open- minded even when one holds a belief 
with a high degree of confidence. But open- 
mindedness might be motivated by more than 
the recognition of human fallibility and the 
desire for truth. In some cases, the motivation 
to be open- minded is based in moral concern 
rather than in the pursuit of truth (although, 
of course, these need not be incompatible).4 
We may be motivated to be open- minded to 
someone else’s point of view simply because 
we care about and respect her.
 To talk about open- mindedness in the moral 
context—that is, as a moral virtue—we need 
the qualification that it is informed by and 
supportive of an agent’s moral concern. I 
use moral concern here in a broad sense as 
including both caring about and respecting 
members of the moral community. In Nomy 
Arpaly’s recent account of open- mindedness 
(2011), robust moral concern is the main 
characteristic of the open- minded person. 
Such a person is one “whose moral concern 
insulates her from the pull of other concerns 
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that would otherwise render her unresponsive 
to evidence, in contexts in which something 
morally significant might be at stake” (Ar-
paly 2011, p. 81). In general, when we really 
care about something, she argues, we are 
more careful about getting it right (p. 78). 
On the way to the airport, for example, one 
might check several times to make sure one’s 
passport is still where one thinks it is. Nor-
mally—that is, when one is not on the way 
to the airport—one will likely feel no need 
to double- check the location of one’s pass-
port. The difference is that, on the way to the 
airport, one cares about the location of one’s 
passport.5 Because the open- minded person, 
on Arpaly’s view, cares about members of the 
moral community, she is motivated to be epis-
temically careful when it comes to her moral 
judgments. Such a person is “prevented from 
being ‘opinionated’—resistant to evidence—
by moral concern” (Arpaly 2011, p. 81).
 If the moral virtue of open- mindedness 
were a kind of robust moral concern that 
orients and improves one’s ability to integrate 
evidence, we would expect that failures of 
open- mindedness could be attributed to the 
lack of such concern. Some failures of open- 
mindedness can surely be explained this way: 
if we hold someone in contempt or moral 
indifference, we are unlikely to be motivated 
to consider the person’s beliefs as serious 
challenges to our own. But it is not clear that 
this is always the case. Consider Arpaly’s own 
example of a young woman who is consider-
ing divorcing her husband. Upon telling her 
parents—who have always supported her 
decisions—she is met with hostility, accused 
of being selfish and not trying hard enough 
to save her marriage. Her parents themselves 
have had a miserable marriage but stayed 
together anyway. To open- mindedly consider 
their daughter’s divorce, they would have to 
revisit their own failed marriage, which they 
are not willing to do (Arpaly 2011, p. 80).
 What is striking about this case of closed- 
mindedness is that it is not well explained in 
terms of a lack of moral concern. We have 
no reason to think that the unhappy parents 
have inadequate moral concern for their 
divorcing daughter. On the contrary, the 
parent–child relationship is, under normal 
conditions, paradigmatic of moral concern, 
and we have good evidence (the history of 
the woman’s relationship with her parents) to 
believe that these parents were not anomalous 
in this regard. Something other than the lack 
of moral concern was responsible for their 
closed- mindedness.
 Arpaly rightly notes that the reason that the 
parents cannot accept their daughter’s divorce 
is “because there is connection to their own 
concerns for their own marriage and their 
own decisions” (2011, p. 80). To consider the 
appropriateness of their daughter’s divorce 
would raise questions about the appropriate-
ness of their own decision not to divorce, 
questions that they worry cannot be answered 
well and so should not be asked. The moral 
failing of the closed- minded parents, then, is 
not a lack of moral concern; on the contrary, 
they are very concerned about their child’s 
happiness and character development. Rather, 
it is their inability to consider displeasing, but 
possibly true, narratives about themselves. 
The parents cannot support their daughter’s 
divorce (which, we are assuming, would 
contribute to her happiness) because they 
are unwilling or unable to consider a dis-
pleasing narrative about themselves, namely 
that a decision that framed their whole adult 
lives—the decision to remain (unhappily) 
married—was a bad one.
 This ability to consider alternative narra-
tives about oneself, especially those that are 
frightening or displeasing, without shutting 
down or lashing out is itself a moral capacity 
that is not well described by the broad concept 
of having “moral concern.” I argue that this 
capacity, which I call equanimity, is, along 
with moral concern, necessary for the moral 
virtue of open- mindedness. In what follows, 
I develop an account of equanimity based on 
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Buddhist philosophical accounts that I argue 
can better explain what the open- minded 
person is doing and what the closed- minded 
person fails to do.
3. What Is Equanimity?
 In Buddhist ethical traditions, equanimity 
(Pali: upekshā; Tibetan: stang snyom) is a 
central moral attitude that is characterized by 
freedom from reactive habits of thought, feel-
ing, and action that allows one to reduce or 
eliminate morally problematic bias. It is usu-
ally conceptualized in the context of the “four 
boundless qualities” (brahmavihāras; tshe 
med gzhi) of love, compassion, sympathetic 
joy, and equanimity. These four qualities are 
the main moral emotions of Buddhist ethics.6 
They are boundless in the sense that they can 
be cultivated to encompass more and more 
members of the moral community and can be 
felt with increasing depth and sincerity (Heim 
2008; McRae 2013). Although equanimity is 
particularly well theorized in Buddhist ethical 
traditions, it should not be thought of as the 
sole purview of Buddhism. Just as one does 
not need to be a Buddhist to feel or exhibit 
love, compassion, or joy, one does not have 
to be a Buddhist to feel or exhibit equanimity.
 Definitions of equanimity in Buddhist 
ethics vary, as we would expect given the 
longevity and diversity of Buddhist tradi-
tions, but they share the basic theme of 
freedom from addictive habits, particularly 
craving and aversion. The Indian philosopher 
Vasubandhu (fourth century C.E.) defines 
equanimity as being “free from addictions in 
the midst of (pleasant and unpleasant) experi-
ences” (Maitreyanātha and Āryāsaṅga 2004, 
p. 228). Buddhaghosa (1956), a fifth- century 
Buddhist scholar of the Pali canon, describes 
equanimity as a “neutral” attitude toward all 
beings and claims that the function of equa-
nimity is “to see equality in all beings,” which 
“is manifested by quieting resentment and 
approval” (IX.96). The ninth- century Indian 
scholar Kamalaśīla, whose work was very 
influential in Tibet, describes equanimity as 
simply “eliminating attachment and hatred” 
(2001, p. 48). According to the nineteenth- 
century Tibetan master Patrul Rinpoche, 
equanimity (stang snyom) means “giving up 
(stang) our hatred for enemies and infatua-
tion with friends, and having an even- minded 
(snyom) attitude towards all beings.”7 For all 
of these thinkers (and, indeed, for Buddhist 
ethicists more generally), equanimity sup-
ports the cultivation of love, compassion, and 
sympathetic joy. This is because when we are 
able to minimize or even eliminate addiction, 
aversion, hatred, and the like that arise from 
morally problematic biases, we are freer to 
feel love, compassion, and sympathetic joy 
for other members of the moral community.8
 Based on these historical definitions, I pro-
pose the following definition of equanimity: 
Equanimity is the freedom from two main 
kinds of vicious habits of mind and body, 
namely craving habits (infatuation, neediness, 
clinginess) and aversion habits (resentment, 
hostility, hatred), which is characterized 
by feelings of tranquility and spaciousness 
that allow one to engage with others (and 
self) in more virtuous ways. There are three 
features of equanimity that are especially 
relevant in the context of understanding open- 
mindedness: (i) its focus on gaining freedom 
from problematic self- narratives; (ii)  its 
mutually supportive relationship with the 
other moral emotions of love, compassion, 
and sympathetic joy; and (iii) its function as 
a second- order affective attitude.
 In general, Buddhists thinkers argue that the 
conception of the self as permanent and inde-
pendent is philosophically untenable, despite 
being psychologically compelling (see Sider-
its, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011). According 
to this view, this untenable conception of the 
self that most of us assume but do not analyze 
creates not just philosophical problems, but 
psychological and ethical ones, including a 
morally problematic preoccupation with the 
self, an unhealthy fixation with building and 
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maintaining certain limiting self- narratives, 
and a warped and morally impoverished 
view of others. In Buddhist ethics, the main 
object of clinging, at the most basic level, is 
this metaphysically and ethically untenable 
conception of the self; the main object of our 
aversion is whatever challenges that concep-
tion.
 By systematically challenging habits of 
craving and aversion, practices of equanimity 
are designed to be antidotes to strong habits 
of preoccupation with the self. Craving and 
aversion, rather than other reactions, are 
emphasized here because they have a special 
place with regard to one’s conception of self. 
Craving essentially says “I want that and must 
have it.” The object of craving is thought of 
as necessary for making one the person one 
thinks one is; aversion, which repels us from 
objects, likewise says a lot about who one 
thinks one is not. To gain some facility with 
observing and intervening in one’s habits of 
craving and aversion, then, is to gain some 
freedom with regard to one’s identifications 
and self- narratives.
 Equanimity, like other moral attitudes and 
emotions, can be cultivated, and much of 
Buddhist ethical discussion of equanimity is 
devoted to the practice of equanimity. Some 
practices involve the systemic scanning of 
the body with the practitioner noting the 
pleasant and unpleasant sensations and the 
accompanying cravings and aversions. The 
practitioner begins to feel the difference 
between a mere unpleasant sensation and an 
aversion, which is her reaction to that sensa-
tion. This allows her to cultivate a certain 
mental distance from unpleasant and pleas-
ant sensations (Aronson 1980; Hart 1987). 
Other, more discursive, practices invite the 
practitioner to consider craving and aversion 
as it arises in her relationships with others. 
Typical narratives about relationships, such as 
the narrative that there is a clear, fundamental 
division between those who are with us and 
those who are against us, are systematically 
challenged (Buddhaghosa 1956; Rinpoche 
1994). As meditative practices, equanim-
ity practices are designed to be practiced 
regularly and over time. Morally problematic 
biases and self- narratives are slowly worked 
out like knots.
 The content of these practices clearly var-
ies—from mindfully noting the pain in one’s 
knee and one’s aversion to it, to contemplat-
ing challenges to some of the basic ways that 
we view our interpersonal relationships—but 
their basic function is the same. These prac-
tices challenge reactive habit patterns. They 
accustom one to the possibility that the way 
one understands one’s preferences, desires, 
beliefs, and narratives about one’s life may be 
mistaken. Through equanimity practice, the 
moral agent is honing her ability to respond 
rather than react, even in the midst of unpleas-
ant or pleasant sensations.9
 Having some freedom with regard to one’s 
habits of thought and feeling, including, im-
portantly, one’s self- conceptions, is a neces-
sary condition of having the moral virtue of 
open- mindedness. What prevented the par-
ents, in Arpaly’s example, from considering 
the possibility that their daughter’s divorce 
may be a good idea? Or, to use another ex-
ample, what might prevent otherwise loving 
and concerned parents from considering that 
their child’s sexuality may not be immoral or 
sinful? To consider these possibilities would 
require them to seriously entertain the idea 
that one of their most cherished identity- 
markers—their religion, their marriage—has 
instilled in them untrue or hurtful beliefs. Not 
only does this open the door to the possibility 
that other core beliefs are also mistaken, but, 
perhaps what is more damaging, considering 
that one may be wrong about, for example, 
the immorality of homosexuality requires one 
to consider that one may have participated in 
a lifelong project of misdirected hatred, con-
tempt, and disgust. A self- narrative of moral 
purity and religious piety would be replaced 
with the self- narrative of one as an accidental 
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bigot, which is, no doubt, highly aversive. 
If these parents lack open- mindedness, it is 
not because they lack moral concern for their 
children, but because they lack equanimity. 
Clinging to one self- narrative and aversion to 
another make it impossible to respond to the 
challenge that their child’s lives and decisions 
present to their beliefs, and so they can only 
react based on the narratives and views that 
are most compelling and familiar.
 The remaining features of equanimity 
highlight its compatibility with the previously 
mentioned features of the virtue of open- 
mindedness: the importance of robust moral 
concern and the second- order awareness char-
acteristic of open- mindedness. In Buddhist 
ethical traditions, equanimity is understood as 
enhancing moral concern, rather than limiting 
or opposing it. This means that equanimity 
is not, as Buddhaghosa (1956) reminds us, 
“unknowing indifference,” but is rather an 
enabler to cultivate moral concern by inten-
tionally and directly minimizing obstacles to 
such concern (IX.101). These obstacles take 
the form of craving habits, such as clinging, 
fixation, and neediness, on the one hand, and 
aversion habits, such resentment, bitterness, 
and hatred, on the other. Although the parents 
in our examples love and have moral concern 
for their children, this love and concern could 
not be engaged or even accessed because of 
the obstacle of the parents’ aversion to con-
sidering new world views and self- narratives.
 In this sense, Buddhist conceptions of 
equanimity serve as a complement to Arpaly’s 
focus on moral concern. Moral concern is 
undoubtedly important since, without it, 
the motivation to be open- minded all but 
disappears, at least in the moral context. If 
the parents do not care about or respect their 
child, they have no incentive to engage in the 
difficult work of evaluating and challenging 
their core values, beliefs, and self- narratives. 
But moral concern becomes impotent if one 
is in the grips of strong habits of craving 
and aversion. Even if it exists, it may not 
be accessible. Failures of open- mindedness 
could be due to either failing, the lack of 
moral concern, or the lack of freedom from 
the relevant habitual reactive patterns, that is, 
the lack of equanimity.
 The final feature of equanimity is that, as 
a way of relating to one’s habits of thought, 
action, and feeling, it is basically second- 
order; it is an affective attitude that one takes 
toward other attitudes, beliefs, and, impor-
tantly, feelings. It is “basically” second- order 
because, in the Buddhist context at least, it 
does have at least one first- order component: 
feelings of tranquility and spaciousness.10 
These feelings arise from the second- order 
freedom from habitual reactive patterns. 
They are simply the affective correlates of 
being free from craving and aversion; one 
feels free from craving and aversion (at least, 
within the relevant context). For the person 
who practices equanimity, challenges to her 
assumptions and self- narratives become 
increasingly less distressing, and so when 
challenges arise, she is more likely to feel 
a sense of spaciousness rather than the un-
comfortable constriction that comes from 
trying to defend an increasingly indefensible 
narrative. Such feelings are characteristic of 
equanimity but are not the goal of equanim-
ity practice, which, in Buddhist ethics, is the 
development of the ability to have stronger, 
less biased, and more sensible moral con-
cern for members of the moral community. 
Allowing this first- order aspect of equanim-
ity—the feelings of freedom, tranquility, and 
spaciousness—to inform our understanding 
of open- mindedness poses no problem for un-
derstanding open- mindedness; it is plausible 
to think that such feelings are also character-
istic of open- mindedness.11 The main reason 
to emphasize the second- order awareness 
characteristic of open- mindedness is to ex-
plain open- mindedness about strongly held 
beliefs. Including equanimity—which has a 
strong second- order orientation—as part of 
open- mindedness does not affect our ability 
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to explain how we can be open- minded about 
what we believe with confidence.
4. Equanimity and  
Open- Mindedness: Some Objections
 Open- mindedness, then, is not equivalent or 
reducible to equanimity; rather, I have argued 
that it is a necessary affective and cognitive 
orientation of the person with the virtue of 
open- mindedness, at least in the moral con-
text.12 I consider two objections to this view.
 First, even if we restrict our inquiry to 
moral contexts, we may worry that the scope 
of equanimity may be too narrow to fully 
account for the virtue of open- mindedness. 
There seem to be cases in which one can 
exhibit open- mindedness and yet fail to have 
equanimity. Consider Jason Baehr’s example 
of the open- minded judge who is committed 
to hearing both sides of a dispute (2011, p. 
194). In this example, she is already neutral 
between the competing views—that is, she 
has no pre- existing biases toward one or 
against another—nevertheless, since she 
gives both a fair hearing, it seems right to say 
that she is being open- minded. But does she 
have equanimity? After all, she had no crav-
ings or aversions toward one view or another 
to gain freedom from. As Baehr argues, one 
need not feel conflict in order to exhibit the 
virtue of open- mindedness. Must one have 
craving and aversions to be free from in order 
to exhibit equanimity?
 The judge in this example does not need 
to cultivate equanimity to have the virtue of 
open- mindedness. But this is not because no 
equanimity is needed; it is because the judge 
already has equanimity. She already has the 
freedom from the relevant cravings and aver-
sions that would otherwise prevent her from 
fairly evaluating both sides of the dispute. But 
what are the relevant cravings and aversions? 
In this example, we know that the judge is 
impartial with regard to the competing views 
between which she is adjudicating, but the 
example is silent about other craving and 
aversion habits that may be affecting her 
ability to be open- minded. As Baehr notes, 
open- mindedness is not opposed only to vices 
such as narrow- mindedness, dogmatism, 
and bias; it is also opposed to vices such as 
hastiness, impatience, and laziness (2011, p. 
195). Given her neutrality between the com-
peting positions, the judge is not in danger of 
exhibiting the first set of vices but may be in 
danger of exhibiting the second set. From the 
point of view of Buddhist ethics, the second 
set of vices also reflects a lack of equanimity 
since, were one to be vicious in these ways, 
one would be giving in to a craving to rush 
or an aversion to listen to something in which 
one has no antecedent interest. Were she to 
succumb to these cravings or aversions, she 
would fail to have equanimity and fail to be 
open- minded. So, if she really is open- minded 
(and is therefore not exhibiting any of the op-
posing vices listed above), then she already 
has equanimity, since she is free from the 
relevant cravings and aversions (for instance, 
to hurry, to shut down, or “zone out”). If she 
lacks equanimity and so is under the influence 
of the relevant cravings and aversions, then 
she also lacks open- mindedness and would 
be exhibiting one of the vices associated with 
closed- mindedness.
 The second objection to equanimity as 
a necessary condition of the moral virtue 
of open- mindedness is that it is not, or at 
least not obviously, compatible with the 
second characteristic of this virtue: robust 
moral concern. The basic worry is that, if 
one really cares about another, one will fail 
to have equanimity because one’s caring 
about another requires one to have and act on 
sets of cravings (for instance, for the other’s 
happiness) and aversions (for instance, to 
that person’s suffering); and, similarly, if one 
has equanimity, then one cannot properly 
and fully care for another. Buddhist ethicists 
are typically sensitive to this concern, which 
is one reason why so many explicitly insist 
that equanimity is not indifference; on the 
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contrary, it only makes one better at caring for 
others. Resolving this tension is not a trivial 
concern in Buddhist ethics, especially given 
the centrality of love, compassion, and altru-
ism, on the one hand, and the significance 
of equanimity and freedom from afflictive 
emotionality and desire, on the other, in Bud-
dhist ethical writings. While I cannot give a 
full account of Buddhist responses to this 
objection here, I will briefly summarize what 
I take to be the strongest case that equanimity 
is compatible with and even mutually sup-
portive of robust moral concern.13
 Recall that on Buddhist ethical views, equa-
nimity is theorized in the context of the other 
four boundless qualities—love, compassion, 
and sympathetic joy. The idea here is not 
that equanimity needs to be balanced against 
love, compassion, and joy, but that equanim-
ity—like love, compassion, and joy—aids 
the development of genuine moral concern. 
This is because it allows one to access feel-
ings of love, compassion, and joy that would 
otherwise be truncated, blocked, or warped 
by one’s reactive habit patterns of craving 
and aversion, as I briefly argued in section 3. 
This seems to what is happening in Arpaly’s 
example of the unhappily married parents: 
their love and compassion for their daughter 
is not accessible to them because it is blocked 
by their reactive habit patterns concerning 
divorce that arise from their own cravings and 
aversions. Equanimity is an enabling affective 
and cognitive orientation; it enables moral 
concern to manifest by reducing barriers to 
having such concern.
 Moral concern, then, on a Buddhist ethical 
view, is not another set of reactive habit pat-
terns of craving and aversion—for two main 
reasons. First, craving and aversion are un-
derstood as involving preoccupation with the 
self, what the self can get or what it can avoid. 
This is true even when the object of craving is 
a loved one. If, for example, I crave my loved 
one’s attention, this desire has more to do with 
me and my needs than genuine concern for 
my loved one. On Buddhist ethical views, we 
can only have proper moral concern when we 
are not preoccupied with ourselves in these 
ways.14 Second, and related, craving and 
aversion, unlike true moral concern, are un-
derstood as “afflictive” rather than liberating. 
They are afflictive because (i) we experience 
them as controlling or compelling us in ways 
we might not otherwise choose, and (ii) they 
lead to or constitute other negative affective 
or cognitive states, such as hatred, envy, and 
ignorance.15
5. Conclusion:  
Who Needs Equanimity?
 I have argued for three main characteris-
tics of the moral virtue of open- mindedness: 
(i) it includes a second- order awareness that 
recognizes one’s fallibility; (ii) it is moti-
vated and informed by moral concern; and 
(iii) requires equanimity. This suggests a 
preliminary definition of open- mindedness 
as a moral virtue: the disposition, motivated 
and informed by moral concern, to recognize 
one’s fallibility as a believer and to integrate 
that recognition appropriately in daily life. 
This integration can occur only when one is 
not overwhelmed by one’s habitual reactive 
patterns of thought, feeling, and action, that 
is, it occurs when one has equanimity. Closed- 
mindedness can occur despite a robust sense 
of moral concern, and even in relationships 
that are otherwise paradigmatic of moral 
concern, such as the parent- child relationship. 
Even when she has robust moral concern, the 
closed- minded person may lack equanimity 
if she lacks freedom from reactive habits of 
mind, particularly those of craving and aver-
sion. This lack of freedom prevents her from 
considering relevant evidence, despite her 
care and concern for others.
 The inclusion of equanimity can explain not 
only failures of open- mindedness, but also 
how the general recognition of fallibility can 
be properly integrated. Equanimity practices 
cultivate self- knowledge through a lens of 
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craving and aversion. It is an emotionally 
inflected self- knowledge: what we learn about 
ourselves by observing and investigating 
what we (think we) must have and what we 
(think we) cannot stand. By tracking feelings 
of craving and aversion, equanimity practices 
highlight the narratives that we are attached 
to and those we cannot allow.
 This kind of self- knowledge is critical for 
the cultivation of open- mindedness, since, 
as I hope to have shown, failures of open- 
mindedness are often due to these craving 
and aversion habits, especially around self- 
narratives. If we know what it feels like to 
be very invested in a particular narrative (or 
very invested in avoiding it), this can serve as 
a “red flag” to proceed with caution. Such red 
flags—strong feelings of craving and aver-
sion—can serve as effective self- monitoring 
tools. By practicing equanimity, one becomes 
familiar with one’s reactive habits through 
safe experimentation; one can purposefully 
challenge them in reasonably safe settings. 
The idea is that, when one’s bias and reactive 
habits are challenged in everyday life, one 
will have developed some resources to meet 
that challenge.
 Finally, equanimity can also explain 
what is “open” about open- mindedness as 
a moral virtue in a way that the concept of 
robust moral concern alone cannot. Arpaly, 
for example, sometimes talks about open- 
mindedness as though it arises when moral 
concern overpowers other concerns. The 
open- minded person is prevented from be-
ing opinionated because her “moral concern 
insulates her from the pull of other concerns” 
(Arpaly 2011, p. 81). But this seems to de-
scribe an over- powered mind rather than an 
open one. Despite her moral concern, a per-
son with equanimity may still feel the pull of 
craving and aversion (and related feelings). 
But her relationship with these “pulls” is 
characterized by a certain distance, curiosity, 
and freedom. She feels them, but is not com-
pletely under their influence. The freedom 
of equanimity captures the intuitive sense of 
open- mindedness as open in a way that the 
mere strength of moral concern cannot.
 Including equanimity in our understanding 
of the moral virtue of open- mindedness can 
help explain failures of open- mindedness that 
are otherwise difficult to explain. Although 
it is true that open- mindedness involves a 
second- order awareness of one’s own fal-
libility, this alone does not explain how such 
an awareness should be integrated into one’s 
thoughts, feelings, and actions in actual 
cases. Equanimity practices help to specifi-
cally address this problem of integration by 
providing methods for working with habits 
of craving and aversion. It is also true that 
open- mindedness as a moral virtue requires 
robust moral concern, but, without equanim-
ity, we cannot explain how failures of open- 
mindedness occur even for persons with such 
concern. Equanimity, then, can explain how 
one’s second- order awareness is integrated 
and how one’s moral concern can be accessed 
and engaged in order to consider challenges 
to one’s beliefs.
 University of New Mexico
NOTES
1. Montgomery (2013).
2. There are other possible interpretations of Montgomery’s behavior according to which she would 
not be exhibiting the virtue of open- mindedness. For example, she may be simply choosing her son 
over her Church because of her strong attachment to her son, without ever considering that he may 
not be a sinner. I resist this interpretation of Montgomery’s actions mainly because she sees herself as 
“unlearning” what she was taught about homosexuality.
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3. The need for selectivity is cleverly illustrated in this farcical headline in the Onion: “Close- Minded 
Man Not Even Willing to Hear Out an Argument on Why Homosexuality an Abomination” (http://www.
theonion.com/articles/closeminded- man- not- even- willing- to- hear- out- argum,35379/).
4. Although sometimes they may be incompatible; see Driver (2003).
5.  Arpaly writes:
We are often more cautious in drawing conclusions when the stakes are high by the lights of our concerns, and 
often less confident in our conclusions once we have drawn them. . . . Perhaps, being in the middle of a real 
estate transaction, it is very important to me that the bank is open tomorrow, and tomorrow is Saturday. If you 
ask me, “Is the bank open tomorrow?” I am likely to respond, “Oh let me double- check.” After all, I have read 
only once, and on the bank’s website, that the bank is open tomorrow; I feel as though I might have read the 
wrong line, and besides, I think to myself, the website could be out of date. I suspect the answer is that the bank 
is open, but I lack confidence: I think I should call and ask. (2011, p. 78)
6. Calling these qualities “emotions” is slightly misleading since there is no word for emotion in the 
traditional languages of Buddhism, no concept of emotion in Buddhist philosophy, and, therefore, no 
dichotomy between reason and emotion (Dreyfus 1994; de Silva 1995; Heim 2008). But because these 
are states with clear affective, cognitive, and volitional components, I refer to them as moral emotion 
for the purposes of this essay.
7. Rinpoche (1994, p. 196).
8. Of course, not all biases are morally problematic. Very generally, for the Buddhist thinkers I have 
cited in this paper, biases become morally problematic when they involve a warped or impoverished 
perception of the moral worth of others or self.
9. This is true even in the body scanning practices, which, on the surface at least, do not seem to have 
much to do with moral development. But one quickly learns, simply from the practice of sitting on the 
floor and remaining aware of one’s body, one’s typical reaction to displeasure and discomfort, which 
is usually some form of aversion ranging from anger (or even rage) to a slight desire to move the body. 
By experimenting with not moving, the practitioner gives herself an opportunity to start to dismantle 
her habitual reactions in order to analyze how helpful they really are.
10. See, for example, Buddhaghosa’s (1956) discussion of equanimity in the Path of Purification (IX.88).
11. I leave this as a hypothesis since I cannot fully address the affective contours of the phenomenology 
of open- mindedness here.
12. I suspect this is also true of open- mindedness as an epistemic virtue, but I do not argue for that here.
13. See McRae (2013) for a more complete account of the compatibility of equanimity and moral concern.
14. This is not a straightforward issue in Buddhist ethics. One has to care about one’s moral and spiritual 
improvement, and so one cares about oneself in a meaningful way, but moral and spiritual improvement 
are defined in terms of emotional sensitivity to others, moral concern, and wisdom. For this reason, 
caring about the self one, on Buddhist ethics, cannot be separated from a deep, abiding, and pervasive 
concern for others.
15. See McRae (2015) for a more complete account of the differences between afflictive and liberatory 
affective states in Buddhist ethics.
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